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Abstract. The impact of generational renewal on political and civic life is often
neglected in public and scientific debates. The disinterest is due, among other
things, to the contributions and overall pervasiveness of research on primary social-
ization and life-cycle effects, as well as a tendency in research to adopt a
Mannheimian perspective on political generations. In fact, cohort analysis of French
self-placement on the left or right of the political spectrum since the 1970s brings to
light major changes. Generational renewal is not politically neutral: it handicaps the
right while bringing about an increase in the proportion of “non-aligned.” Moreover,
studying generational renewal reveals a profound transformation of the notions of
left and right in France, due to the new importance of cultural issues and redefined
attitudes toward politics generally and voting in particular.
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Public debate is not equally attentive to all social and demographic changes.
Some are central to our social and political agenda and concerns while others
remain on the margins. Inequalities related to position in the life cycle—whether
they concern labor market entry or exit—are regularly debated in France, whereas
it is hard to gain recognition for the issue of unequal opportunity between individ-
uals born in the 1940s and 50s whose lives dovetailed with the good times of the
Trente Glorieuses [thirty-year post-war economic boom in France and Europe]
(Chauvel 2010; Peugny 2009) and their juniors.
Nor is generational renewal given much public attention, though it would
certainly seem just as important to understanding change in French society as the
rise of “grey power” (Viriot-Durandal 2003) linked to population ageing. In 1981,
when François Mitterrand came to power, 42% of voters had been born before
World War II, more than a fourth of them (28%) in 1930 or earlier. In 2012, that
category accounted for only 11% of voters (2% if we count only those born in
1930 or earlier). On the other hand, half of voters in 2012 were not old enough to
vote in 1981 (18% had not even been born), and when Mitterrand was reelected in
1988, 36% of 2012 voters could not yet vote.
Generational renewal is also too often absent from political sociology research.
Age and life-cycle effects are fully accredited ways of apprehending sociopolitical
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phenomena. The 2012 election polls were used as grounds for widespread debate
on what determines how “young people” vote or why older people support the
incumbent president. But they seldom served as an opportunity for probing the
question of whether people voted “by cohort.”
Yes, “young people” and “seniors” each have their own legitimate collective
needs. Yes, the life-cycle question is a major one in the social sciences in general
and in political sociology in particular when it comes understanding how young
people’s attitudes toward politics develop or how older and oldest persons manage
to maintain social ties (Thomas 1996). But does this mean that we should not pay
attention to possible cohort effects? Often it seems to. Cannot the fact that people
who grew up during a period of mass unemployment and increasingly precarious
employment—also a period of record support for France’s extreme right National
Front party—are now eligible to vote impact on the political situation in France?
Cannot their world views, ideas about the role of the state, even their political
priorities sharply differ from those of voters who experienced the abundance and
upward social mobility of the 1960s and 70s? And does not the socialization of
voters born before World War II play a role in determining their political ideas
and the way they understand the debates dividing left and right today?
My purpose here is to test the hypothesis that generational renewal does have
political impact. I first examine why cohorts are so seldom studied in electoral
sociology, showing that an approach in terms of cohorts can enrich our under-
standing of French political life on condition that we steer clear of the “political
generations” trap. Second, I show that there are clear political differences between
cohorts. To do this, I examine one of the strongest structuring characteristics of
politics: left/right self-identification. Using the Eurobarometer surveys (1976 to
2009) I show that cohorts are distinguished from each other as much in terms of
left/right balances as attitudes toward politics. Third, I explain these distinctions
by showing the importance of the shift from “old politics” to “new politics”
(Knutsen 1996), namely in connection with the rise of cultural values, and the
profound change in attitudes toward politics due to erosion of “duty-based
citizenship” (Dalton 2007).
Cohort analysis in political sociology:
Why the blind spot?
Cohort analysis developed considerably in French sociology following studies
by Claudine Attias-Donfus (1988) and Louis Chauvel (1998). Why did this not
also occur in the nearby field of political sociology? Explanations vary. One
possible reason is the influence of research results on “life cycle” impact; another
is the popularity of Karl Mannheim’s theory of political generations ([1928]
1990); yet another, a kind of empirical culture that has impeded the development
of cohort analysis.
Indisputable life-cycle effects
Many studies have observed the effects of position in the life cycle, first on
young people but also on the elderly. The young people/old people opposition is
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often studied, and different spheres have been examined, ranging from political
parties and organizations to the workplace (Cottereau 1979) and the polls (Rouban
2004).
A significant proportion of these studies bear on how “young voters” are social-
ized and on training for and entry into citizenship. Annick Percheron initiated a
particularly fruitful research tradition in France, beginning with her study of how
political attitudes get shaped in childhood (1974), research that was related to and
that dialogued with the English-language studies of the time (namely Easton and
Dennis 1969). Anne Muxel’s concept of “political moratorium” (2001a) has greatly
enriched our understanding of the process through which young people gradually
assume the role of citizen. On reaching voting age they are characterized by vola-
tility in terms of candidate choice and the decision whether or not to vote altogether.
As they proceed through life stages on the path to adulthood (leaving parents’
home, finding a life partner, finishing their education and entering the job market),
their political attitudes gradually crystallize. This understanding brings to mind the
founding literature in English on the subject, wherein the (relative) stability of iden-
tification with a political party in the United States was explained in terms of the
gradual structuring of attitudes toward the two major American parties in the course
of the individual’s first voting experiences (Campbell et al. 1960). David Butler and
Daniel Stokes (1970), whose ideas were further developed by Mark Franklin
(2004), understood a person’s attitude toward the voting act to develop in their
youth: the necessary condition for becoming a regular voter is to have voted in three
consecutive elections during one’s young years; people who do not do so become at
best intermittent voters and at worst consistent non-voters. These studies contrib-
uted a great deal to our understanding of attitudes toward politics, but their success
and the phenomena they brought to light worked to limit interest in analysis of other
“conjugations of social time,” namely the cohort. And the success in political soci-
ology of the theory of political generations further impeded interest in the cohort
approach.
The trompe-l’œil of “generation”
In her account of how the term “generation” is used, Annick Percheron (1993)
is representative of researchers’ attraction to Mannheim’s generation model and
their relative disinterest in cohorts. She begins by distinguishing several uses from
each other. The first refers to the distinction between grandparents, children and
grandchildren. The second refers to positions in the life cycle.1 The third, which
later became dominant in political science, applies to individuals who experience
a significant event at the same moment in their lives. This use became particularly
popular in connection with the notion of “political generation,” at the expense of
the fourth meaning: cohort. For Percheron, cohort refers only to the problematic
of different ages (which is true if one is working on a single survey). Along with
many other researchers in France—for example, those brought together by Marie
Cartier and Alexis Spire for a 2011 issue of Politix—Percheron chose to research
“political generations” in Mannheim’s sense of the term.
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The conditions for the emergence of political generations thus became a major
scientific question in France. Any one event is not enough to create a political
generation, and Mannheim himself made an important distinction: “A generation
(or potential generation) brings together individuals located at a given moment in
a given space. However, this situation is not sufficient to make them a generation.
To become a generation, those individuals have to be confronted with a particular,
potentially destabilizing event”;2 “We can only speak of a generation group for
cases where real social and intellectual content establishes a real tie between indi-
viduals in the same generational situation in that very space of destabilization and
renewal.” Only under those conditions can a political generation emerge, and even
this is not enough: Mannheim recalls the importance of intellectual circles of the
sort that create interpretive keys that work to develop and maintain generational
self-awareness.
The concept of political generation is seldom encountered in voting sociology,
though it is slightly more likely to be used in sociology of political and party
elites. On the basis of a panel study of a cohort of high school students in the
United States who graduated in 1965, Kent Jennings (1987) brought to light a
“protest generation,” lastingly affected by the student movements of the time. Not
all respondents actually participated in those movements (only a third of those
who continued into higher education). But the opinions and attitudes of those who
did were lastingly impacted (in terms of judgments on Republican presidential
candidates, party identification, opposition to prayer in the schools, support for
the federal government and civil liberties). To summarize Jennings’ conclusions,
there was indeed a “political generation” in this cohort, created by shared partici-
pation in crucial events that occurred in respondents’ young years. Equivalents in
France might be the generations of May’68 and the Algerian war, both cited by
Percheron (1993).
Quantitative sociological research into political generations in France has not
been very fruitful because there are not enough crucial events, a factor also cited
to explain infrequent use of cohort analysis. April 21, 20023 was a crucial political
moment in France for that decade, but can we conclude that it created a political
generation? It is hardly surprising that the political generation concept is more
likely to be used in study of political elites and activists. Researchers in the
afore-cited issue of Politix discovered political generations in tobacco sellers’ and
lawyer’s organizations as well as those of secondary school teachers and Domini-
cans. But in these closed social organizations this is understandable. First, the
mere play of social and political selection that decides who belongs to a political
or professional organization makes activists stand out from the rest of the popula-
tion because they are more interested in politics and have higher levels of political
competence. Events of the sort that supposedly turn a given group into a genera-
tion are therefore not likely to have escaped their awareness. Above all, they
operate in social networks where the same events are highly likely to be recalled
on a regular basis, thereby keeping memory of them very much alive. Marie-Claude
Lavabre (1994) identified distinct generations of communist activists that differ
from each other in terms of the moment they joined the party and the strata of
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2. Quoted by Vincent Drouin (1995: 22).
3. [The winners of this first round of the
2002 presidential election, held on April 21,
were the traditional right candidate and, unexpec-
tedly, the extreme right candidate.]
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communist memory they experienced. In the same vein, Florence Joshua (2007)
identified different generations of Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR)
activists: there are the 1960s and 70s “guardians of the temple,” and there are
those who joined in the 1990s and 2000s, socialized by “alter” culture.4 A politi-
cized world based on inter-acquaintanceship and memory maintenance is propi-
tious for the “political generation” concept.
Focusing on how political generations get constituted—an approach that has
proven its value for understanding several phenomena—also works to limit appre-
hension of effects possibly associated with cohorts. By concentrating on condi-
tions for the emergence of generations, conditions that are by definition rare and
striking, we have left aside “low-intensity” events and movements that may also
leave their mark on individuals at varying levels of consciousness. In other words,
by looking for “big events,” we may miss gradual, diffuse processes that have just
as much power to forge opinions or attitudes and that distinguish certain cohorts
from those that precede or follow them. April 21, 2002, hardly changed the given
situation, and in particular had no impact on voter turnout, but does this mean that
the new voters of the 2000s are identical to their counterparts born in the 1970s?
And surely the former are even less similar to those born in the 60s. For these new
citizens, the Berlin Wall is already history, and communism and anti-commu-
nism—so crucial in shaping the electoral order of the 1970s (Martin 2000)—prob-
ably do not mean much to them. Likewise Mitterrand and the social battles of the
1970s that led to his victory in 1981 are at best a “second-hand” memory trans-
mitted during family gatherings, if indeed such reminiscing is done. However,
another context may have had a role in structuring this recent cohort that was
strong enough to account for its specific attitude toward politics, an attitude strong
enough to persist even at those moments when those individuals cross the thresh-
olds between the different stages in their life cycle. Cohort effects make theoret-
ical sense, even if they do not meet “political generation” criteria.
One question does remain, however: with the exception of a few remarkable
studies—Drouin 1995; Tournier 2004; Schweisguth 1998; Mayer and Roux
2004—why has French quantitative political sociology so thoroughly disregarded
cohorts? Behind the theoretical prism that makes it so difficult to imagine or
conceptualize cohort effects can also be seen a kind of empirical prism—what
could be called a data culture problem.
Analyses too often based on single surveys
Polling institute reports clearly reveal the influence of this empirical culture.
They present us with “routinized” social science thinking and approaches to classi-
fication that legitimate certain readings of survey results rather than others. The
persistence of “head-of-household’s occupation” as an indicator shows how the
notion of household is dominated in France by the “male breadwinner” model
(Lewis 1992). Routinized data-sorting variables are used even when their impact on
survey questions is only marginal. Choice of these variables is therefore determined
not by the aim of explaining the phenomenon in question but by pollsters’ ways of
conceiving the social world. Otherwise we would see more “variation in variables.”
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4. [The “alter”native movement, seeking alternatives to globalization or alternative ways of
globalizing.]
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One variable that is systematically used is age. The life span is broken up into
segments whose relevance is seldom questioned or debated5 at a time when the
boundaries between life-cycle periods are becoming increasingly blurred (Van de
Velde 2008; Le Hay et al. 2011). The birth cohort variable, on the other hand, is
systematically absent. This is probably due to information availability, since
age—i.e., year of birth—is an everyday analytic category. But the pervasiveness
of that indicator also reveals how the life-cycle notion dominates our representa-
tions. Moreover, only in the case of a single survey can age and cohort be thought
of as two sides of the same coin: for a survey conducted in 2008, the 18-24 age
group forms the cohort of individuals born between 1984 and 1990.
But when responses at several moments of inquiry are available, assuming that
those moments are sufficiently distanced from each other, then it becomes
possible to distinguish what in an individuals’ opinions may be attributed to their
moment in the life cycle and what may be due to the moment at which they were
born, assuming that there are no period effects to complicate matters. Having two
surveys, one conducted in 2008 and the other in 2018, would allow for following
the 1984-90 cohort at two moments in “its” life cycle. In 2018, those individuals
will be between 28 and 34, and may reasonably be assumed to have moved into a
new stage in their lives.
French electoral sociology suffers from a lack of surveys. The first academic
study was done in 1978; the second in 1988 and the third in 1995. It was in that
year that Drouin (1995) first analyzed the effects of cohort on voting in France,
but his approach was not widely adopted: the vast majority of recent studies still
rely on single surveys. Though the results of past surveys on one or several ques-
tions are often cited in connection with new surveys for comparison purposes, this
is usually at the level of the electorate as a whole or “canonical” groups such as
social class, gender, religious practice and, of course, age group.
Cohort analysis thus suffers in France from a polling culture and a research
culture that do not allow it to develop fully. One reason for this is how
sociopolitical surveys are funded: French institutions are not likely to subsidize
polls that extend beyond a single, short-term purpose. Political panel surveys (Le
Hay 2009) are developing in France, but often they cover only a brief time lapse
(April-June 2002 to April-June 2007, for example).6 Muxel’s panel study (2001b)
is the only long-term French survey of this kind; she apprehended the gradual
entry into political life of persons voting for the first time in 1988. But even in this
framework, cohort analysis came second to probing the effects of the life cycle.
Only one cohort was followed, and it is of course difficult to identify a single
cohort’s specificities. Muxel explained the sympathy of rightwing and centrist
respondents for the 1995 strikes in France by the fact that those individuals had
participated in the French high school demonstrations of 1986-87. But is this
cohort so different from others that reached voting age in the 1980s? Was it not
instead part of a wider movement for acceptance of unconventional political
participation? Clearly there have been both theoretical and empirical obstacles to
the development of cohort analysis in France. And yet surveys that could be used
to do cohort analysis do exist.
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5. Annick Percheron and Jean Chiche
(1988) expressed surprise at this.
6. The ELIPSS panel may change this in
the near future.
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Left and right—a matter of cohorts?
In this article I use the Eurobarometer Trend File assembled by the University
of Mannheim and covering the period 1970-2002, supplemented by me for the
period 2003-09. In 2009 the question on left/right self-identification disappears
from the surveys. This type of data does not, of course, allow us to follow the
same individuals at different moments of their lives, so we will not be able to
reason on changes at the individual level. But it does allow for following and
analyzing groups—cohorts—over time.
I have analyzed changes in left/right self-identification (Figure 1) to demon-
strate the impact of generational renewal. Despite discourse dismissing such iden-
tifications as no longer relevant, left and right are among the most central, stable
political categories. Not only have they been references in France for two centu-
ries, but they are among the first interpretive keys that children encounter in the
socialization process in France (Percheron 1974) and they are still individuals’
primary means of political self-definition in this country, in contrast to the United
States, where people identify first and foremost with a party.7
I have also chosen this variable to facilitate comparisons over time. I could
have chosen others, such as identification with a given party or voting choices, but
the party system has greatly changed in France since the “quadrige bipolaire” of
the 1970s8: the institutionalization of the National Front and the ecologists makes
comparison more complex. Above all, as Muxel points out, voting choices “do not
really engage individuals, or in any case less so than other attributes of their polit-
ical identity, and they are subject to the immediate economic context. Individuals
may hesitate and even change their vote without calling into question their initial,
more or less founding political attachments” (Muxel 2011: 26). Moreover, as
Muxel understands it, left/right identification is still the strongest, most pervasive
political attachment.
Left/right identification also gives the analysis greater density. It is a means of
covering the whole period, including ordinary political years in which there are no
elections, which is useful since elections years are by definition particularly sensi-
tive to immediate context. Still, this choice has a cost in terms of political nuances
both within the left and in relation to the extreme right National Front.9
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7. On the general question of types of
political categories and different cognitive
rankings of them in France and the United States,
see, among others, Converse and Pierce (1993);
Fleury and Lewis-Beck (1993); Percheron and
Jennings (1981); Tiberj (2004).
8. [“Quadrige bipolaire”: understanding of
French politics as organized into two left-
identified and two right-identified parties.]
9. For some authors (Chiche et al. 2000;
Grunberg and Schweisguth 1997), politics in
the 1990s in France was tripartite: left/right/
National Front. This idea is certainly a means
of understanding how people voted in the first
rounds of elections from 1995 to 2002, but it
only accounts for part of the phenomenon: 1) it
does not apply to the second rounds of presi-
dential or legislative elections, which were
usually played out between left and right; 2) it
is based on party attachments and actual voting
decisions that we know to be fragile and
unstable (Chiche, Haegel and Tiberj 2004), in
contrast to left/right self-identification, as we
have already seen; 3) recent political develop-
ments have frittered away fundamental diffe-
rences between the right and the extreme right
in France (Mayer 2007; Tiberj 2012).
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The variable of interest was recoded into three positions: left/right/center or
refusal to specify (also termed “non-aligned”). Given the scale of 1 to 10 used in
Eurobarometer surveys, this breakdown is open to objection. See Appendix 1 for
justification of it.
To test the hypothesis that generational renewal does have an impact, I broke
down the respondent population into cohorts using the neutral criterion of birth
decade. I could have broken it down by important moments in French political life
(Denni 2011), but this would have turned the proceeding into a search for political
generations in Mannheim’s sense. Moreover, testing on the basis of purely arith-
metic (and therefore arbitrary) breakdowns makes the cohort impact test particu-
larly conservative and conclusive.
The highs and lows of left/right self-identification
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FIGURE 1. Political identification in France from 1976 to 2009
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, supplemented by Tiberj for 2003-09. The data were
smoothed over a period of three years.
Reading: Proportions of respondents identifying with the left, the right, or neither left nor right, year
by year.
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Left/right self-identification has changed in France—considerably. Over the
period, an average of 34% of respondents identified with the left, but this
frequency ranges between an annual minimum of 30% (in 1985) and an annual
maximum of 38% (in 1996).10 Standard deviation for the series is 1.8 percentage
points. Right identification variation is even wider: while the average for the
period is 29%, the minimum was 21% (in 2000) and the maximum 36% (in 1985),
standard deviation of 3.8. Consequently, the third response category has also
changed: a period average of 37% of respondents either refused to identify them-
selves or positioned themselves in the center of the left/right axis; the minimum
was 31% in 1979 and the maximum, 45% in 2001 (standard deviation of 3.9).
These highs and lows are worth analyzing in and of themselves, but that is
beyond the scope of this article. However, three remarks should be made. First,
these changes seem to follow thermostatic logic (Wlezien 1995): when one side is
in power, the number of people identifying with it decreases. This is particularly
striking from the 1970s to the beginning of the second term of Jacques Chirac
[Gaullist, traditional right].11 In this respect, France’s profile is fairly comparable
to party identification in the United States (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002).
Second, the increase in French voters’ distrust of politics is expressed by an
increase in number of respondents positioning themselves in the center of the
left/right axis or refusing to position themselves.12 Third, the right was on the rise
in the 2000s, at the expense of “non-aligneds,” which partially explains Nicolas
Sarkozy’s success in 2007.
Cohorts’ ideological destiny
Cohorts differ from each other on two points: internal left/right balance and
proportion of “neither left nor right.”
Left/right balance differences between cohorts are particularly striking.
Cohorts born before World War II seem the most favorable to the right both at the
beginning and end of the period (Figure 2) while those born in the 1950s or later
seem particularly favorable to the left. For example, in the cohort of voters born in
1930 or earlier, the right is an average of 8 points ahead of the left. The only
exception is the period when the Socialist Lionel Jospin was in power; slightly
more individuals identified with the left than the right. The second most
right-identified cohort is made up of individuals born in the 1930s. Across the
period, the left was behind an average of 4 points in this cohort, with a maximum
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10. The same phenomenon was found in
TNS-Sofres polls conducted in the 1980s and
1990s (Marcel and Witkowski 2003).
11. The number of left-identified persons
fell 3.5 points from 1981 to 1985, rose during
the two years Chirac was prime minister
(+ 5 points), fell again from 1988 to 1992
(- 3 points), rose again until President Chirac
dissolved the parliament in 1997 (+ 5 points),
then once again declined, until 2002 (- 5 points).
12. We observe two gradual rises of this
phenomenon. The first began with Mitterrand’s
reelection; the second corresponds to the years
that the Socialist Lionel Jospin was in power. In
both cases, the fall in number of persons
supporting the side in power—anticipated by
the thermostat effect—led to an increase in
number of non-aligned rather than in supporters
for the opposite side, as if neither of the two
political alternatives satisfied the voters. This
phenomenon culminated in 2001, when 45% of
respondents were non-aligned (against 30% in
the late 1970s).
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deficit of 10 points (in the mid 1980s, Chirac’s second term as prime minister). In
some periods—e.g., during the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing—the left
did just as well as the right.
One cohort alone gradually moved right over the period: individuals born in
the 1940s. On average, the left was 4 points ahead of the right in this cohort (an
advantage that reached almost 15 points in the late 1970s), but in 2007, the right
pulled ahead of the left and has remained there. This cohort encompasses the
oldest baby-boomers and stands in contrast to the youngest baby-boomer cohort,
born between 1951 and 1960. In that cohort, the right was an average of 14 points
behind the left throughout the period, and in 2007 the left not only did not recede
but gained ground. So with the exception of the mid-80s, the proportion of
left-identified individuals in this cohort has systematically exceeded the propor-
tion of right-identified ones by at least 10 points.
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FIGURE 2. Ideological balances within cohorts
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, supplemented for 2003-09 by Tiberj. Data smoothed over
a three-year period.
Reading: The proportion of right-identified individuals was subtracted from the proportion of left-identi-
fied individuals for each year and each cohort. A zero score signifies perfect left-right balance; a negative
score indicates right alignment; a positive score left alignment.
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The three cohorts that arrived during the period alongside those four cohorts
already “established” in civic life by the mid-1970s also leaned heavily to the left.
That side enjoyed an advantage ranging from 11 points among individuals born
between 1961 and 1970 to 16 points among individuals born in 1981 or later.13
However, at the moment the 1961-70 cohort appeared on the electoral scene, left
and right fared equally with respondents. This occurred during the left’s worse
years: the Socialist governments of Pierre Mauroy and Laurent Fabius. Later, the
left gradually pulled ahead in this cohort. A similar though not as marked
phenomenon is found for voters born between 1971 and 1980: they reached voting
age during the Socialist governments of Michel Rocard, Edith Cresson and Pierre
Bérégovoy. The left made spectacular strides forward in this cohort as soon as the
Rassemblement pour la République (RPR [Gaullist])-Union pour la Démocratie
Française (UDF [center-right]) right alliance came back to power. Moreover, the
strong ideological power balances in favor of the left in the cohorts of the 1960s
through the 1980s are explained primarily by low right-identification rates among
these individuals. In these three cohorts, the proportion of right-identified individ-
uals was systematically below the 25% threshold, whereas in cohorts more favor-
able to the right overall, the figure for right-identified respondents was between
30% and 40%.
Period has an impact on left/right power balances in cohorts just as it does at
the scale of the electorate as a whole. This is clear if we look at the 1981-88
period. In the four cohorts called upon to choose between Mitterrand and Giscard
d’Estaing, the left/right power balance changed, first in favor of the right (10 to
16 points), then the left (5 to 20 points). We also observe period effects between
1992 and 2002; namely a rise of the left until it came to power, then a fall until
2002. Lastly, from that year on it is reasonable to hypothesize political polariza-
tion between individuals born before 1951 and those born later: the former seem
to have moved right, namely after 2004, in contrast to individuals born in or after
1951.
Choosing not to choose
Up to now we have been focusing on political balances between two of the
three possible positions. But changes in “non-aligned” identification are also
highly informative (Figure 3). First, we find the period effects already noted at the
scale of the population as a whole: highs in “withdrawal” from political concerns
in the early 1990s and early 2000s. Here too this seems to hold for all cohorts,
including the oldest. Second, we find the political moratorium effect (Muxel
2001a), particularly visible for the two newest cohorts, born between 1971 and
1980 and in 1981 or after: they encompass a large proportion of individuals who
identified with neither left nor right before drawing closer to the average elec-
torate. This life-cycle effect is probably also at work in the cohort born between
1961-70, though it is less visible at this analytic level.14 And it is indeed a
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13. The same result was found in 2007
(Michelat and Tiberj 2007).
14. However, when we control for such
variables as education level, the phenomenon
becomes even more marked compared to the
oldest cohorts. I return to this point further on.
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life-cycle effect: it generally takes “new entrants” some time to determine their
political identification. Moreover, their politicization seems to have worked to the
advantage of the left rather than the right, namely for the last two cohorts in the
1990s and 2000s. However, when the moratorium was over, the “non-aligned”
level in post-baby-boom cohorts remained fairly high, surely a sign that they have
been affected by the climate of distrust15 of political officials felt in France since
the 1980s.
A real cohort effect?
Is there an age effect lurking behind cohorts?
Until now I have been using cohorts to interpret Eurobarometer data, but might
those data be better explained by age? Here we encounter the problematics of
Age-Period-Cohort thinking and modeling (APC).16 I could have used recent
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15. In 1977, 42% of respondents in a Sofres
poll expressed the opinion that politicians care
“slightly or not at all” about their voters; in 1990
the figure rose to 69%. In the 2000s, it never fell
below 63%, reaching a record high of 78% in
2009. In 1977, 38% of the French thought that
politicians were fairly corrupt. In 2000, 64%
thought so, and in 2009 the figure reached 72%.
16. This thinking takes off from an equation
in which individual’s age can be analyzed
entirely in terms of period and year of birth.
FIGURE 3. Proportion of non-aligned in cohorts
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, supplemented by Tiberj for 2003-09. Data smoothed over
a three-year period.
Reading: Proportions of respondents in each cohort identifying with neither the left nor right, year by year.
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research in connection with those models, but I chose instead the approach in
terms of “side information” (Converse 1976).17 The point is to accept the limita-
tions of available methods, including when we are confronted with techniques as
powerful as logistic regression, and to focus on theoretical aspects and informa-
tion provided by other variables. Here, for example, we can posit that age does
affect political identification, that there is indeed a life-cycle effect. Logically,
then, cohorts should be affected similarly when their members reach a given age.
But though the political moratorium hypothesis (a life-cycle effect if ever there
was one) is confirmed by information on arriving cohorts, it is hard to find any
other such effects.
For example, we do not observe an advance of the right in most cohorts. The
1941-50 cohort began shifting rightward after Mitterrand was elected, at a time
when the individuals in question were between 31 and 40. But no such move
seems detectable for their juniors, born between 1951 and 1960, when they
reached the same life-cycle stage, starting in 1991. The same holds for voters born
between 1961 and 1970, who began reaching that life-cycle stage in 2001. Age
effects are hard to find, though each of the cohorts “already there” did age thirty
years between the beginning and end of our period. In other words, the observed
cohort effects do not translate into age effects. The 1931-40 cohort was already
one of the two most right-identified cohorts when Mitterrand was elected; i.e.,
when the individuals in it were between 41 and 50 years of age. And this was still
the case when Chirac won, at which time they were between 55 and 64, not to
mention Sarkozy’s victory, when they were between 67 and 76. The 1951-60
cohort was the most strongly left-identified of all cohorts in 1981 (the year
Mitterrand was first elected), when the individuals in it were between 21 and 30.
And it remained so, even when Sarkozy was elected and cohort members were
between 47 and 56. Period effects, on the other hand, understood as an effect of
the time and affecting all or some segment of voters, did indeed occur, as we have
seen.
Composition effects?
Up to this point, I have remained within the bounds of descriptive analysis of
relations between cohorts and political identification. Even on this basis we can
specify a potential impact of generational renewal: the next majority will not
favor the right because the weakness of right identification is what most distin-
guishes recent cohorts, and that weakness benefits non-alignment or withdrawal.
But is that relation significant once we have controlled for other social character-
istics? And if it is, how can we explain it?
Differences between cohorts can be explained among other things by hypoth-
eses about composition. All or some political differences between cohorts may be
due not to being born and socialized at a given time but rather to a “mere” differ-
ence in cohort composition. Recent cohorts differ from older ones by level of
education and attitude toward religion, among other variables. The new ones are
characterized by strong atheism: 41% for the 1961-70 cohort, 45% for the
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17. See the special section on this question in Sociological Methods and Research (2008).
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1971-80 cohort, and 48% for 1981 and later. We can also note the rise of Islam in
the most recent cohort (5% of its members identify themselves as Muslim). This
profile already sets these cohorts off, as only 13% of the cohort born in 1930 or
earlier, 18% of the 1931-40 cohort, 25% of the 1941-50 cohort, and barely
one-third of the 1951-60 cohort stated “no religion.” Furthermore, Catholics
account for approximately 80% of cohorts born before World War II and are still
the majority in the 1961-70 cohort. Religions differences have always constituted
one of the most influential sociological explanations for how the French vote
(Michelat and Simon 1977; Dargent 2004; Tiberj 2012). Recent cohorts may be
more left-identified because less Catholic.18
Cohorts also differ from each other by education level. Fifty-six percent of
individuals born in 1930 or earlier left school before age 14/15. The figure is 39%
for individuals born between 1931 and 1940 and 23% for those born between
1941 and 1950. For individuals born after 1960 it falls to 3%. On the other hand,
only 8% and 12% respectively of voters born before World War II say they left
the education system at 21 or over; the proportions are 21% and 24% for the two
baby-boomer cohorts, 32% for voters born between 1961 and 1970, 52% for the
1971-80 cohort of individuals and 63% for those born in 1981 or later.19 Educa-
tional level would not necessarily be thought of as a traditional explanation of
left/right self-identification except that it was undeniably influential in the rise of
new professional groups, a development that in turn brought about strong political
reconfigurations (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1983). This applies to sociocultural
professionals in the medical-social or educational sectors, said to be one of the
new bastions of the left (Kriesi 1998). Likewise, educational level is generally
associated with the shift to post-materialist society and its new issues, such as the
environment, male/female equality, and cultural openness (Inglehart 1977) but
also economic globalization, with its “winners” and “losers” (Kriesi et al. 2008).
Lastly, educational level, along with sex and occupation, is a standard sociological
explanation of individuals’ level of political competence (Converse 1964;
Bourdieu 1977; Gaxie 1978): a higher educational level usually goes together with
greater ease in choosing political sides.
It is important, then, to check the impact of the cohort variable by controlling
for other variables of the same kind. However, the Eurobarometer surveys make
this difficult: the number of socio-demographic variables is low compared to other
French and international surveys; more importantly (and as happens in other
surveys), choices were made that limit available data. The questions—including
socio-demographic ones—were not systematically repeated from survey to
survey. Survey teams altered questions themselves, making certain comparisons
over time impossible.20 I have therefore concentrated on Eurobarometer surveys
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18. The political impact of Islam is a
subject of debate in France. Claude Dargent
hypothesizes that being Muslim in and of itself
inclines people to the left, whereas other resear-
chers posit that Muslims’ political self-identifi-
cation is an effect of migrant origin (Dargent
2003; Tiberj and Simon 2012).
19. “Clearly,” age on completing education
is exaggerated—this is often the case for
surveys in France. In this respect, the Eurobaro-
meter surveys suffer from a bias present in
many other French studies, including academic
ones.
20. This holds for religion: for example, the
question of religious affiliation was not asked
in 1982, 1983, 1985, from 1999 to 2004, in
2007 or 2009, no explanation given. It was
tempting to combine it with the practice of
attending mass but this changed over time (in
some cases from one year to the next) and that
question was actually asked less often than the
one on religious affiliation.
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that include the following variables: cohort, age at end of education, respondent’s
occupation (or most recent occupation), religion, sex. The analysis is based on
29,306 respondents, and the period (1976-2008) and number of usable waves (36)
are still considerable. A model-specification problem arises: What about the time
factor and the variations it induces? Here the point is not so much to model (and
thereby understand) how and why left/right/non-aligned identification changes
from one year to the next but rather to check whether belonging to a given cohort
has an impact on political identification. I therefore adopted the statistically costly
solution of handling years as if they were categorical data (Table 1).21
Clearly, some of the observed differences between cohorts are due to composi-
tion effects, but this is only a partial explanation. Independently of the other indi-
vidual characteristics tested here, being born and socialized in a given period does
have a significant impact on an individual’s political identification. If we consider
left or right identification without any control variable, respondents born after
World War II are between 1.5 times (for the 1971-80 cohort) and 2.25 times (for
the cohort born in 1981 or later) less likely to identify with the right than the left
compared to the 1931-40 cohort. The 1941-50 cohort differs slightly from the
reference cohort: it is 1.25 time less likely to identify with the right than the left.
The 1930 or earlier cohort, on the other hand, is 1.5 times more likely to be right-
than left-identified. If we compare the cohorts at opposite ends of the period—i.e.,
the oldest and the most recent—for left/right identification we see that the most
recent is 3 times less likely to be right-identified than the oldest. Introducing
educational level does not change this cohort-related observation and even tends
to accentuate it (though we are still within margins of error for the coefficients).
This does not hold for religion or occupation. In fact, all odds ratios tend toward 1
(or equal probability) between Model 2 and Model 3, and Model 4 respectively.
Some differences between cohorts are due to composition effects, then; namely
differences in religion and occupation. Recent cohorts are more left-identified in
part because they have fewer Catholics, more Muslims and more atheists than the
older, most strongly right-identified cohorts.22
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21. This leads to calculating 38 coefficients
(20-minus-1 years for two tests), which
consumes degrees of freedom and makes no
substantial contribution, but that point is
secondary here.
22. In Model 4, Muslims and atheists are
4 times more likely than Catholics to be left-
instead of right-identified, while “other
religion” respondents are 1.5 times more likely.
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TABLE 1. A resistant cohort effect:
Four nesting multinomial regression models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Non-
aligned
vs left
Right
vs left
Non-
aligned
vs left
Right
vs left
Non-
aligned
vs left
Right
vs left
Non-
aligned
vs left
Right
vs left
Cohort
1930 and earlier 1.16*** 1.23*** 1.12** 1.26*** 1.09* 1.20*** 1.07 1.14***
1941-50
.807*** .824*** .857*** .809*** .891*** .867*** .904* .915
1951-60
.859*** .568*** .953 .545*** 1.03 .628*** 1.03 .685***
1961-70 1.00 .581*** 1.18*** .558*** 1.33*** .699*** 1.32*** .768***
1971-80 1.11* .687*** 1.48*** .679*** 1.73*** .913 1.65*** .959
1981 and later
.915 .448*** 1.22 .440*** 1.50*** .653*** 1.41*** .713**
1931-40 (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
Age at end of education
15-17
- - .923* 1.19*** .957 1.27*** 1.00 1.31***
18-20s
- - .808*** 1.24*** .849*** 1.36*** .908** 1.35***
21
- - .533*** 1.09* .580*** 1.28*** .645*** 1.15**
14
- - (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
Religion
Muslim
- - - - .589*** .241*** .591*** .236***
Other
- - - - .788*** .608*** .795*** .591***
None
- - - - .527*** .261*** .543*** .262***
Catholic
- - - - (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
Occupation or former occupation
Self-employed
or farmer
- - - - - - 2.02*** 3.85***
Manager
and higher
intellectual
professions
- - - - - - .866*** 1.52***
Office worker
- - - - - - .973 1.33***
Not working
- - - - - - 1.11** 1.79***
Manual worker (ref.) - - - - - (ref.) (ref.)
Sex
Woman
- - - - - - 1.17*** .874***
Man (ref.) - - - - - (ref.) (ref.)
N 29,306 - 29,306 - 29,306 - 29,306 -
Log likelihood
- 31,533 - 31,362 - 30,627 - 30,263
R2 0.0136 - 0.0189 - 0.0419 - 0.0520 -
Note: There was not enough space here to include the coefficients for each year. Several are significant,
either for left or right self-identification or non-alignment compared to left identification. In other words,
the developments noted at the overall level are not artifacts.
Reading: The coefficients are odds ratios. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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But cohort differences, though reduced, remain significant in most cases. The
1951-60, 1961-70 and 1981-and-later cohorts are between 1.3 and 1.5 times more
likely to be left- rather than right-identified than 1931-40 cohort members. And
with religion, sex, occupational and educational level controlled for, that refer-
ence cohort is not different from voters born between 1941 and 1950 or between
1971 and 1980. What differentiates them is not the cohort they belong to but their
attitude toward religion and other characteristics. On the other hand, individuals
born before 1931 are distinguished by a stronger attraction to the right. Moreover,
when this cohort is used as reference, all the cohorts that followed it are signifi-
cantly less right-identified.
If we look at non-alignment, post-baby-boom cohorts show an interesting
particularity. The two pre-World War II cohorts seem initially to differ from the
two baby-boomer cohorts on probability of center identification or refusal to posi-
tion themselves, with the more recent cohorts being significantly less likely not to
choose and the oldest more likely not to choose. But once we take into account the
classic social patterns associated with political competence (educational level,
occupation, sex), these four cohorts are no longer different from each other. If the
baby-boomers are less likely to choose not to choose, this is not because they were
born and socialized at a specific time (e.g., the 1970s) but because they are more
highly educated and more likely to work as managers or supervisors. In other
words, classic patterns of socio-political domination are at work in these four
cohorts.
The situation is very different for the 1961-70 cohort and those that followed it.
Differences between this set of cohorts and the reference cohort (1931-40) deepen
once we have controlled for educational level, sex, occupation and religion. This
set of cohorts is not different from the cohort born in the 1930s in Model 1, but
once the other variables are taken into account it is from 1.25 to 1.5 times more
likely not to choose between left or right. In sum, given its education level, this set
of cohorts should be more often left- or right-identified than the reference individ-
uals, but what happens is just the opposite. This reveals a new phenomenon: the
disinterest in politics affecting certain members of these cohorts is clearly not due
to the usual suspects; i.e., domination and political incompetence. In sum, cohorts
do differ from each other, and this differential is only partially explained by
composition effects, namely education level and attitude to religion. Generational
renewal is therefore not neutral for politics and seems to have two major conse-
quences: first, an increasing disadvantage for the right, since the cohorts that lean
most heavily to that side are also the ones that will be leaving the scene, replaced
by cohorts more inclined not to choose the right; second, a rise in the proportion
of disaffected citizens. We now must try to understand these two trends.
The rise of new politics
Since differences in left/right self-identification by cohort cannot be explained
by divisions along the social lines of class and religion, we have to turn to other
factors, namely value systems. Might these cohorts differ from each other because
their opinions on the major issues dividing French society differ? If so, do they
differ along classic dividing lines such as preferred size and role of the state,
wealth redistribution, social welfare and economic freedom—i.e., the substance of
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“old politics”? Or do they differ because they stand opposed on socio-cultural
issues like immigration and multiculturalism, sexual minority rights, permissive-
ness—i.e., “new politics”?23 Another hypothesis: Is it because the various cohorts
do not attribute the same content to the notions of left and right, the older cohorts
thinking in terms of economic issues and freedoms whereas recent cohorts think
also or solely in terms of what may be called cultural issues? My aim here is to
test Ronald Inglehart’s hypothesis (1977) that post-materialist politics is replacing
materialist politics and the possibility that France has shifted from politics
anchored in socio-economic issues to “two-axis” politics where individuals’ polit-
ical positions are produced by their degree of liberalism, be it economic (i.e.,
laissez-faire) or cultural (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1990; Chiche et al. 2000;
Tiberj 2012).
Cohort values:
Cultural divergence, socio-economic convergence
The Eurobarometer surveys lack the necessary questions, so I compiled the
results of French presidential polls from 1988, polls conducted by the Centre de
Recherches Politiques of Sciences Po (CEVIPOF 1988, 1995, 2007), the
CEVIPOF and other institutions (2002), or the TriÉlec network (2012). With these
surveys we observe the same two generational renewal phenomena brought to
light in the Eurobarometer surveys:24 the more recent a cohort is, the more it leans
to the left, at the expense of the right, and the larger its proportion of non-aligned.
The surveys I assembled allow for capturing the values and individual norm
systems aspect, but there is still the major problem of comparing indicators over
time. Only two questions in the four surveys from 1988 to 2007 can be used for
measuring socio-economic preferences, and only four can be used for the cultural
preferences dimension—not at all sufficient. I have made do with what there is.
Using principal component analysis, I extracted socio-economic and cultural pref-
erence factors from the set of value indicators available over time (a guarantee of
relatively high quality). This enables us to compare individuals from a single
survey on these two dimensions. For details on the method used see Appendix 2
and for an in-depth analysis on the subject, see Tiberj 2012. I use the terms
“economic” and “socio-economic” to discuss “old politics” values; e.g., values
related to wealth redistribution and preferred size and economic role of the state.
The terms “cultural” and “socio-cultural” refer instead to the values associated
with “new politics”; i.e., those concerned with authoritarianism, mores and life-
styles, tolerance of homosexuality, immigration, multiculturalism.
Political differentiation between cohorts cannot be explained by socio-
economic preferences. The gaps between old and recent cohorts on this point are
slight.25 For example, in 1995, individuals born in 1930 or earlier barely differed
from those born after 1960, though the more recent cohort is strongly
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23. This distinction between new and old
politics appeared following publication of studies
by Oddbjørn Knutsen and Ronald Inglehart (see
in particular Houtman, Achterberg and Derks
2008).
24. The corresponding figures are available
on request from the author.
25. They even prove non-significant once we
take into account education level, sex, occupation
and attitude toward religion. This is not the case
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left-identified in comparison: 20% of the former fall into the strongly
“pro-government intervention in the economy” quartile as opposed to 26% of
those born between 1961 and 1970 and 25% of those born in the following cohort.
In four of the five surveys used, the cohort with the strongest presence in the
strongly “pro-government intervention” quartile was the one made up of individ-
uals born between 1951 and 1960. The range is still relatively narrow (0 to
8 points). By contrast, for 2012 it widened significantly (+ 22), as if the cohort
born in 1930 or earlier were “moving right” while the others were not.
Variations on socio-economic preferences are particularly slight compared to
those for cultural preferences. As the different Cramér’s V show, the gap between
the null hypothesis (cohorts distributed exactly the same way on the factors)
and the actual data is systematically greater for cultural preferences than for
socio-economic ones—as much as four times greater in 2002. When it comes to
normative positioning, then, the cohorts differ from each other first by attitudes
and preferences on immigrants, authoritarianism, and tolerance in general before
differing on the state’s economic role or preferences with regard to wealth redis-
tribution. The more recent a cohort is, the more of its individuals fall into the
culturally most liberal quartile, and the fewer fall into the culturally most conser-
vative quartile.26 This holds for both 1988 and 2012. For instance, 38% of voters
born in 1930 or earlier were among the most conservative fourth of voters in 1988
and only 9% fell into the most liberal fourth of voters, as against 14% and 37% for
the 1961-70 cohort. In 2012, the respective figures for voters born in 1930 or
earlier were 46% and 13%, whereas the corresponding proportions for the most
recent cohort were respectively 12% and 35%. The stability of results from one
presidential election to another is striking (Table 2).
“Cultural change” and the two ways it influences politics
The cultural values dimension is indeed the source of political differences
between cohorts. To demonstrate this, I integrated individuals’ positions on
socio-economic and cultural factors into multinomial regression models, a means
of explaining the ideological positioning of each cohort, namely for each presi-
dential election.
Two conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, in 1988 in all cohorts,
preferences on the state’s economic role and wealth redistribution heavily influ-
enced probability of left identification (Figure 4). For individuals born in 1930 or
earlier, the probability of left identification is between 2% and 7% (depending on
cultural positions) if they belonged to the most laissez-faire fourth of voters, and
between 84% and 90% if they belonged to the fourth of voters most strongly in
favor of government intervention in the economy.27 “Old politics” was the key
here, at a time when France’s leftist governments were already well along in the
process of converting to market economics. Second, cultural factor impact varies
by cohort.
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for cultural preferences (Tiberj 2012).
26. These results corroborate those found
by Mayer and Roux (2004), Schweisguth
(1998) and Stimson, Tiberj and Thibaut (2010).
27. Left rather than right or neither left nor
right.
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TABLE 2. Distribution of cohorts along normative socio-economic
and cultural dimensions (1988-2012)
Socio-economic factor Cultural factor
Soc-ec-- 2 3 Soc-ec++ Cult-- 2 3 Cult++
1988
1930 and earlier 33 24 18 26 38 35 18 9
1931-40 33 21 25 21 28 34 23 16
1941-50 24 23 28 25 23 30 24 23
1951-60 21 26 29 25 15 25 28 32
1961-70 23 26 30 22 14 23 26 37
Cramér’s V 0.0814 0.1858
1995
1930 and earlier 28 27 25 20 41 30 20 9
1931-40 26 30 21 23 38 26 24 12
1941-50 29 21 27 24 27 31 21 21
1951-60 23 23 25 29 22 25 25 28
1961-70 26 25 22 26 19 26 26 29
1971-80 19 24 32 25 11 22 25 42
Cramér’s V 0.0686 0.1774
2002
1930 and earlier 26 28 23 23 50 27 14 8
1931-40 27 26 21 26 35 29 19 17
1941-50 22 29 25 24 34 24 25 17
1951-60 26 26 20 28 27 23 23 27
1961-70 24 27 21 27 15 23 30 31
1971-80 17 29 26 27 10 17 34 39
1981-90 14 29 28 29 6 18 31 45
Cramér’s V 0.0594 0.2120
2007
1930 and earlier 38 20 21 21 36 28 28 9
1931-40 34 20 28 19 38 29 21 12
1941-50 32 21 24 23 33 27 22 18
1951-60 25 25 21 29 31 23 25 20
1961-70 20 27 27 26 25 22 26 27
1971-80 25 21 31 23 15 17 33 36
1981- 17 26 29 29 12 14 29 46
Cramér’s V 0.0985 0.1853
2012
1930 and earlier 45 21 23 11 46 21 21 13
1931-40 37 25 20 19 42 25 18 15
1941-50 33 26 19 22 39 26 20 15
1951-60 20 23 24 33 28 25 22 25
1961-70 23 26 25 27 21 27 26 25
1971-80 21 24 30 25 16 25 30 29
1981- 20 27 29 24 12 23 30 35
Cramér’s V 0.1051 0.1624
Note: Quartiles were calculated for each factor and each presidential election.
Percentages indicate the proportion of the cohort falling into the given quartile.
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In the oldest cohort, born in 1930 or before, which at the time still accounted
for 30% of the electorate, cultural values have the least influence on whether indi-
viduals feel they belong to the left or not. That influence is much stronger in the
two baby-boomer cohorts. Let us consider the hard core of pro-government inter-
vention voters; i.e., the fourth of voters most likely to identify with the left given
their socio-economic preferences. Depending on whether they belong to the
culturally most conservative voters or the culturally most liberal, left identifica-
tion probability ranges from 6 points for individuals born before 1931 to 20 points
for the 1931-40 cohort to 22 points for the 1951-60 cohort and 26 for the 1941-50
cohort. And if the change is already considerable among these voters, who, once
again, strongly favor state intervention in the economy, the impact of cultural
values is even more forceful among individuals whose socio-economic prefer-
ences are fairly “centrist” (quartiles 2 and 3): variations in the baby-boomer
cohorts range from 33 to 40 points. On the other hand, the hard core of
laissez-faire voters remains relatively insensitive to cultural values.
In other words, in 1988, people belonging to the oldest cohorts identified
with the left for socio-economic reasons whereas baby-boomers and their juniors
identified with the left for both socio-economic and cultural reasons. For the
first group, questions of xenophobia or “openness,”28 homophobia or tolerance,
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FIGURE 4. Impact of socio-economic and cultural factors
on left identification in 1988
Source: CEVIPOF-Sofres voter survey, 1988.
Reading: Shown here are average probabilities (expressed in %) of left identification as predicted by the
model as a function of birth cohort and individuals’ positions on socio-economic and cultural factors. A
probability of 0% (or 0) indicates certain other-than-left identification; a probability of 100% (or 1)
means certain left identification.
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authoritarianism or “permissiveness” are beside the point; these individuals iden-
tify with the left because they want greater wealth distribution and more state
intervention in the economy. Baby-boomers, on the other hand, can very well
identify with the left while being laissez-faire in their socio-economic prefer-
ences, as long as they are also culturally liberal. Cultural preferences were already
influential when Mitterrand was reelected, and they explain why certain cohorts
voted more for the left than others in that election: those cohorts may be more or
less conservative overall, but the more recent they are, the more determinant
cultural preferences are for their political identification. The causes of the “new
social movements” of the 1970s (the environment, women’s rights, new personal
freedoms) but also the issues of immigration and xenophobia that emerged in the
1980s weighed heavily on post-war cohort individuals’ political identification.
These differences between cohorts constitute the first way in which the cultural
factor influences left/right self-identification.
But the influence of the “cultural dimension” does not stop there, as we see
when we analyze the impact of our two normative preference factors on proba-
bility of left identification in 2011-12 (Figure 5). Clearly “old politics,” rooted in
socio-economic oppositions, has not disappeared; regardless of birth cohort or
cultural position, the likelihood of individuals’ choosing the left is not the same if
they are more strongly economic-laissez-faire than economic-interventionist. For
example, even among the culturally most conservative voters born in 1981 or
later, the probability of left identification ranges from 4% (for the most strongly
laissez-faire) to 32% (for the most strongly in favor of government intervention).
“New politics” issues weigh much more heavily now than in 1988; more
importantly, their influence is felt in all cohorts. If we come back to the hard core
of “economic interventionist” voters of 1988, we see that the maximum impact of
cultural preferences was 26 points. In 2012 the differences ranged from 35 points
for the 1951-60 cohort to 70 points for the cohort born before 1931. The ranges
are considerable even for the hard core of laissez-faire voters: 14 points for the
1931-40 cohort, 26 points for the baby-boomer cohorts, 30 to 38 points for the
cohorts that succeeded them, and 51 points for the oldest cohort. Left identifica-
tion is clearly polysemous: some individuals identify with the left because of their
socio-economic preferences, others because of their cultural preferences and many
because of both factors. In other words, “le peuple de gauche”29 (but also the
peuple of the “droite” [right]) is increasingly diverse, whereas it used to cohere
solely around its set of socio-economic values.
Not only is an individual’s left/right self-identification not stable over time but
the motivations for that identification also change. We might have predicted this
given the highs and lows of the left/right divide; my analysis confirms it. This
means we have to revise the dominant understanding in electoral sociology that
left and right are particularly stable attitudes constructed in youth and the first
years of adult life and are not likely to change later on. Individuals belonging to
the oldest cohorts identified with the left or right in 1988 because of their
socio-economic values, whereas in 2012 they did so for both socio-economic
and cultural reasons. Individuals’ left or right self-identifications are surely
more stable than their voting intentions, actual voting records or even party
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28. Word used by Chiche et al. (2000).
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identifications, but at a scale of several years even this characteristic changes
considerably, and in accordance with clear criteria; namely, the policies of
governments in place and the grounds on which political parties do battle.
Diachronic comparison of the models applied to voters born in 1930 or earlier
allows for pinpointing moments when the influence of the cultural factor on left
identification was particularly strong (Figure 6). Influence was weakest in 1988;
strongest in 2012. But the trend is not regular. Already for the 1995 presidential
election cultural values were assuming importance as a reason for left identifica-
tion, but that impact seems to have diminished in 2002. Political context may have
had an important role here, both in determining the left/right balance in the elec-
torate and defining what individuals meant by left and right. It is surely not by
chance that cultural values weighed so heavily given that the political parties
themselves, including the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the Union pour un Mouvement
Populaire (UMP; right-identified), had begun integrating them into the ways they
differentiate themselves and compete with one another. Today’s major presiden-
tial candidates diverge as much if not more on “cultural” questions than socio-
economic ones.
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FIGURE 5. Impact of socio-economic and cultural factors
on left identification in 2011-12
Source: TNS-Sofres/TriÉlec opinion polls, July 2011, October 2011, December 2011, February 2012,
March 2012, funded by Sciences Po Bordeaux, Grenoble and Paris and the Interior Ministry.
Reading: Shown here are average probabilities (expressed in %) of left identification as predicted by
the models as a function of individuals’ birth cohort and positions on socio-economic and cultural factors.
A probability of 0% (or 0) means certain other-than-left identification; a probability of 100% (or 1) means
certain left identification.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent downloaded from
 www.cairn-int.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.93 - 29/01/2016 12h44. © Presses de Sciences Po 
Another relationship to politics?
Value systems explain trends in left and right self-identification within cohorts
but cannot account for the advance of non-alignment in recent cohorts. This
advance is particularly unexpected because it goes against the cognitive mobiliza-
tion theory put forward in the 1970s and 80s by Ronald Inglehart (1977) and
Russell J. Dalton (1988). In the 1950s, political science cast the “ordinary citizen”
as an ill-informed person not much interested in politics who does not really
understand the fundamental political concepts and whose opinions are inconsis-
tent and changeable (Converse 1964). Inglehart and Dalton broke with this,
putting forward instead an optimistic interpretation of development in advanced
political societies: though the citizens of the time certainly did not meet the
demands of theorists of democracy, they would gradually be replaced by other,
more educated individuals who would therefore be better equipped to engage
politically. It was and is true that the higher an individual’s educational level, the
more likely he or she is to be a competent citizen. However, in comparison with
their counterparts born in the 1940s and earlier, the real “new citizens” who have
come on the scene do not comply very clearly with cognitive revolution theory
predictions. This phenomenon, already perceptible in the fact that people are more
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FIGURE 6. The rise of the cultural factor in the 1930-or-earlier cohort
Source: CEVIPOF-Sofres post-election surveys, 1988 and 1995; French electoral panel survey, 2002;
CEVIPOF-Interior Ministry-IFOP post-election survey, 2007; TNS-Sofres/TriÉlec surveys.
Reading: Shown here are average probabilities of left identification (expressed as %) as predicted by the
models as a function of positions of individuals born in 1930 or earlier on socio-economic and cultural
factors. A probability of 0% (or 0) means certain other-than-left identification; a probability of 100%
(or 1) means certain left identification.
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likely now not to indicate either left or right identification, may be found for other
indicators of attitude toward politics, used either in the Eurobarometer surveys or
French voter surveys. The latter cover different aspects, such as distrust of polit-
ical officials and interest and engagement in public affairs.
Clearly, cohorts born after 1950 are less invested in politics, in terms of
frequency of political discussions, interest in public affairs, and image they have
of political officials (Table 3). The results are particularly robust given that
“cohort effects” are controlled for by other socio-demographic variables—the
most important being education level, sex and occupation—and that they derive
from several surveys and therefore several years of observation. In other words,
cohort effects cannot be reduced to a life-cycle effect. For example, individuals
born between 1961 and 1970 are 2.5 times more likely never to discuss politics
(than to discuss politics often) than are individuals born in the 1930s. This result
holds for the entire period in which the question was asked, be it in 1990, when
those individuals were between 20 and 29, or in 2006 when they were between 36
and 45. It may seem to substantiate pessimistic views of the impact of genera-
tional renewal on attitude toward politics, the idea that we are entering an era of
“disenchantment with democracy” (Perrineau 2003) or a “society of distrust”
(Algan and Cahuc 2007). But there is another possible explanation.
First, in response to the rise of political distrust characterizing France and
other countries (Schweisguth 2002), analysis has often focused on citizens,
seldom on the responsibility of political actors themselves, whereas that might
be relevant in explaining, for example, the specificity of a cohort that shows
a particularly negative attitude toward politics for all three indicators—the
1971-80 cohort. With other variables kept equal, individuals from this cohort are
1.9 times more likely than individuals from the 1931-40 cohort to discuss poli-
tics sometimes (and 3.5 times more likely never to discuss politics) than often.
They are also 1.9 times more likely not to be interested in politics and 1.4 times
more likely to think that “political officials don’t care about people like [us]”
than the opposite.
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TABLE 3. Impact of cohort on different indicators of attitude toward politics
Occasionally
discuss politics
vs
often
Never discuss
politics
vs
often
Not interested
in politics
vs
interested
Think that political officials
don’t care about people like us
vs
think that political officials care
about people like us
1930 and earlier
.960 1.20*** 1.12* .972
1941-50 1.03 .975 1.03 1.12*
1951-60 1.27*** 1.32*** 1.24*** 1.19**
1961-70 1.72*** 2.51*** 1.73*** 1.17*
1971-80 1.91*** 3.48*** 1.94*** 1.37***
1981 and later 1.45* 1.94*** 1.76*** 1.03
1931-40 (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
Reading: Shown here are odds ratios for the cohort variable with educational level, occupation or former
occupation, attitude toward religion, and survey year controlled for. The “political discussion” variable
comes from the Eurobarometer survey; for the “interest in politics” and “politicians care about people
like us,” I used the French presidential election and TriÉlec surveys mentioned above.
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These individuals arrived on the French political scene in the 1990s, a period
when both right and left were implicated in public finance scandals, the period in
which Jospin declared, “The state cannot do everything”—whereas sixteen years
earlier the left claimed it wanted to “change people’s lives.” A significant propor-
tion of the 1971-80 cohort was surely affected by this political climate in their
first years of adulthood. The socialization hypothesis becomes relevant here. To
push a bit further in this direction, it is worth noting that the cohort of individuals
born in 1981 and later seems less withdrawn than its immediate predecessor: it is
less likely to be politically non-aligned, not to be interested in politics, and not to
discuss politics. This can also be understood in terms of the impact of the period
in which these individuals reached voting age, a time of fewer political scandals
but sharper left/right polarization, notably due to Sarkozy’s actions.
Lastly, we can reason with reference to Dalton’s interpretation (2007) of
observed trends in Western countries. As he sees it, we are shifting from
“duty-based citizenship” to “engaged citizenship.” This means that the norms
associated with the “good citizen” have changed considerably in recent decades.
The duty dimension (voting, obeying the law, pledging allegiance to the nation-
state, being ready to die for one’s country), also present in “scruple-based citizen-
ship” (Duchesne 1997), is declining, overtaken by a vision of citizenship based on
individual autonomy and engagement (determining one’s own opinions, being
active oneself in politics and associations, supporting the have-nots).
The hypothesis of an erosion of duty-based citizenship dovetails well with trends
in voting attitudes. Clearly, voting is no longer something people do automatically.
As early as 1997, abstention signaled more than rejection of the political system; a
segment of voters “abstain within the game” (Muxel 2003) and voting and
abstaining alike are becoming more intermittent (Héran 2004). Stéphane Jugnot
(2007) estimates the proportion of intermittent voters in France at 40.2%. As
predicted by the political moratorium theory, young people are the most likely to
vote intermittently (over 50% of under-35s). What is more surprising is the figure
of 40% for citizens from 45 to 49, an age when the political moratorium would
seem to be behind one.
Underlying the persistence of intermittent voting we find the impact of genera-
tional renewal and the changed attitude toward citizenship that seems to be char-
acteristic of current generational renewal. I compared cohorts’ reported voting in
French presidential elections, known to mobilize the greatest numbers of voters,
and European Union parliamentary elections, the least likely to mobilize French
voters (Figure 7).
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Studies of abstention based on the results of self-reporting surveys are often
criticized for bias. Some respondents may in fact conceal their real behavior,
choosing to report behavior that complies with the socially approved “civic
norm.”30 Still, the differences in reported behavior for the two elections are
striking. For presidential elections the cohorts are practically indistinguishable.
This holds regardless of how old or recent the cohort is and whether the elections
were characterized by overall high or (relatively) low voter turnout. Presidential
elections, then, seem to elicit maximum voter turnout in all cohorts if we take into
account systemic abstention (e.g., for sickness or other disabilities, etc.). For
European Union elections the situation is fundamentally different. Here, the more
recent a cohort is, the less likely its members are to turn out. This is particularly
true for cohorts born after 1950, as in the preceding analyses. There are two
possible interpretations of these cohort variations: 1) they are due to real behav-
ioral differences; 2) the relevance and resonance of the civic norm varies by
cohort. Whatever the answer, the result denotes differentiated attitudes toward
voting. Older cohorts tend to be either constant voters or more sensitive to voting
“as duty” (and are therefore more likely to conceal any abstaining). Recent
cohorts have a much more context-bound attitude toward voting, shifting from
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FIGURE 7. Cohorts at the polls:
A comparison between French presidential and EU elections
Source: CEVIPOF-Sofres post-electoral surveys, 1988 and 1995; French electoral panel survey, 2002;
CEVIPOF-Interior Ministry-IFOP post-electoral survey, 2007; French electoral survey, 2012; European
Electoral Studies 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009.
Reading: Proportions of respondents in the different cohorts reporting that they voted (rather than abstain-
ed) in French presidential and European Union elections since 1988.
29. [Mass of supporters for the left. The term peuple was initially strongly left-identified.]
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heavy turnout for French presidential elections to low turnout for European elec-
tions. While reported turnout varies by only 8 points in the cohort of individuals
born between 1931 and 1940, the range is 14 points in the baby boomer cohorts,
22 points among individuals born in the 1960s, and reaches as high as 31 points
among those born in 1970 and later. Clearly election type counts for recent
cohorts. If the election seems important (issues, campaign, etc.) then turnout is
high, and similar to levels among the older cohorts. When the election seems of
secondary importance, the proportion of abstainers rises considerably. What char-
acterizes these individuals, then, is not that they have broken the political tie; if
that were true they would not go to the polls for major elections. These intermit-
tent voters—who choose whether or not to turn out—are fairly representative of
the emergence of “citizenship as a set of individual rights (rather than duties),”
which they exercise when they think they have good reason to.
*
* *
Sociopolitical analysis is too often based on only two of the three forms of
sociological time: period and age. The third—generational renewal—should not
be neglected, especially since it is not politically neutral. The electorate to come
will not be the same as the departing one, either in terms of values, ideological
perspectives, or attitude toward the role of citizen. Above all, if the trends shown
here turn out to apply to future cohorts, they will have an increasing impact on
France’s electoral future. Already today turnout from one election to the next
varies at an unprecedented scale. In the late 1970s the difference between the
EU election (1979) and the French legislative elections (1978) came to only
22 percentage points. The gap between turnout for the 2007 presidential election
and the European elections of 2009 was 43 points. As “duty-based voting” cohorts
are replaced by “individual right-based voting,” it is highly likely that these gaps
will widen. Regardless of whether we consider this an unfortunate development, it
is one that seems at present difficult to reverse. The rise of intermittent,
context-based voting is not new evidence that democracy is in crisis. Recent
cohorts are less interested in politics and discuss it less than their other social
characteristics (namely education level) seem to suggest. They also feel more
distant from political personnel. But first, this does not apply to all individuals in
these cohorts. Second, these cohorts do turn out and play their role at the polls
whenever what is at stake seems important enough to them. Lastly, generational
renewal is going hand in hand with progress in the value of tolerance. In this, my
results confirm studies on trends for xenophobia and homophobia in France
(Mayer and Roux 2004; Schweisguth 1998).
All in all, generational renewal seems a crucial key for understanding French
social and political trends—one that is as important as population ageing, immi-
gration or labor market trends. It is only reasonable to plead for more systematic
use of cohort analysis in political sociology.
Vincent TIBERJ
Centre d’Études Européennes (CEE)–Sciences Po
27, rue Saint-Guillaume
75337 Paris cedex 07
vincent.tiberj@sciencespo.fr
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1. Recoding the left/right self-identification variable
The way the Eurobarometer surveys measure left/right self-identification makes it something
of a challenge to recode this variable. The question reads as follows:
“People talk about ‘right’ and ‘left’ in politics. Could you indicate your position on this
scale?” (SHOW RESPONDENT THE CARD)
(INTERVIEWER: DON’T MAKE ANY SUGGESTION. IF RESPONDENT HESITATES, INSIST)
Refuse to answer…………..........……………………..………….………………….....…11
Don’t know………………………………………………………………………....…........12
The French and American tradition is to ask respondents to locate themselves on a 7-point
scale. The European Social Survey uses an 11-point scale. In both cases there is a clear central po-
sition—in contrast to the Eurobarometer surveys where, mathematically, the center is 5.5. If we
calculate strictly, then, the “5” and “6” response categories in the Eurobarometers correspond to
“center”; 1 to 4 to “left,” and 7 and above to “right.”
But we can also posit that respondents do not calculate this way and that for them the only
“neither-left-nor right” box is “5.” In this case, “left” response categories remain the same and
“6” indicates right identification. In both cases, refusal to answer and “don’t know” responses
were ranked with “center” responses.
The essential point here is to determine the boundary between “neither-left-nor-right” and
right. To find the accurate dividing line, I analyzed voting intentions as measured in the Eurobaro-
meter surveys.31 Caution is in order, because doing so means combining survey waves; i.e., extre-
mely varied political contexts (in connection with the National Front party, for example, or the
ecologists) from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. Likewise, voting intentions measured in election
years are not likely to have the same meaning as intentions measured during ordinary political
years or periods. However, the heterogeneous data do provide us with sufficient information for
the purposes of this appendix.
There is of course no strict correspondence between ideologically identifying with a given
side and intending to vote for a party identified with that side. The relative porosity can be explain-
ed either by lack of political competence or “defection,” a phenomenon found in many elections
and countries. Lastly, in some contexts left-identified voters in France may vote for the right to
sanction socialist governments just as right-identified voters might vote for the left in the opposite
circumstances.
However this may be, the simple cross-tabulation above supports my recoding choice. The dif-
ference between individuals choosing box 4 rather than 5 is striking: 65% expressed an intention
to vote for the communists or socialists and nearly 10% for the ecologists (though the meaning of
this last vote is polysemous), while 21% planned to abstain or refused to answer. The right won
less than 5% of their votes. Individuals who chose box 5 are distinct in two ways: their high level
of indecision or withdrawal, as 42% say they do not know, refuse to answer or plan to abstain; the
drastic fall in intentions to vote for the left (down to 28%), whereas the right and extreme right to-
gether win 18% of their voting intentions. This set of respondents recall the polysemy of “cen-
ter-identified” ones in other political identification measurements: it encompasses true ideological
centrists, ordinary voters who in choosing this response reveal their political incompetence, and
voters who identify with none of the traditional parties.
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30. Using signed voting lists obviously enables researchers to steer clear of this bias.
31. The variable in question, designated “VOTEINT” in the Eurobarometer Trend File, measures
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The boundary between left and non-left, then, is quite clear. What about the right? Here we are
concerned with the status of box 6. Respondents who chose it are politically different from those
choosing box 5. The right and extreme right win 49% of their votes while the traditional left gets
no more than 11% and the ecologists 7%. However, these voters are also characterized by with-
drawal, as nearly a third of them reported an intention to abstain or said they did not know who to
vote for. Box 6 respondents clearly fall between those in boxes 5 and 7, but they are closer to box
7 than 5, namely in terms of their rightward electoral leanings (especially if we consider reported
voting intentions only). Consequently, it seems more accurate to rank them with the right than to
think of them as alter egos of box 5 respondents.
By choosing not to exclude “don’t know” and “refuse to answer” respondents but rather
grouping them with box 5 respondents, I am aware that I have accentuated the “withdrawal from
politics” feature of this code, at the expense of ideological centrism.
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FIGURE 8. Reported voting intentions by left/right self-identification
Source: The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002.
Reading: Percentage of voting intentions by left/right self-identification.
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APPENDIX 2. Measuring normative preferences
The point here is to present the major features of the method I used to construct measures of
voters’ cultural and socio-economic preferences. Readers wishing to know more about the method
should see my article, “La politique des deux axes: variables sociologiques, valeurs et votes en
France (1988-2007),” specifically the appendix on method.
I had two objectives: 1) comparability over time; 2) robust empirical measurements of
socio-economic and cultural dimensions.
French electoral surveys are characterized by a weak time series culture. From 1988 to 2012,
only two questions on socio-economic values were systematically asked: opinions on privatiza-
tions and profits. The situation is slightly better for cultural values: we have series on the death
penalty, immigrant numbers and the role of the schools. But in neither case do we have the mini-
mum number of questions needed over the entire period to generate sufficiently robust and
reliable attitude scales.
On the basis this situation I made the following three assumptions:
1) If we follow the literature on the question, there are indeed two value dimensions, one
cultural, the other socio-economic;
2) The survey questions available therefore amount to tests that allow for measuring these
normative preferences;
3) Certain questions are more useful for doing this than others.
With these points in mind, the idea was to extract factors for each value dimension and each sur-
vey (a total of 5*2 cases) using data analysis methods. I did principal component analysis, factorial
analyses and multiple correspondence analysis, obtaining strongly corroborative results.
To ensure factor comparability I selected a subset of questions, those asked at least twice, the
assumption being that this was a guarantee of their intrinsic quality; the various factors were nor-
malized and centered: all have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1; relations between fac-
tors over time were analyzed with different variables of interest to check that they do measure the
same phenomenon.
This way of proceeding does not allow for measuring trends in voters’ socio-economic or poli-
tical preferences over time (as would have been possible with an attitude scale or techniques like
“mood”), but it does give a measure of their positions on these dimensions compared to the entire
sample. We can determine, for instance, whether they belonged to the 10% of culturally most
conservative voters in 2012 or 1988. Once again, the aim here is to check if a difference in indivi-
dual position on the socio-economic factor, the cultural factor, or both induces different ideolog-
ical identifications.
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